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Committee Socialization in the
U.S. House of Representatives

JAMES
L. Gurn
Furman University

INTRODUCTION
Students of Congress have long been aware of informal norms or
rules of behavior which are thought to be important for th e successful
functioning of the legislative system and are regularly inculcated in new
members of Congress. Donald R. Matthews, Ralph K. Huitt, Charles L.
Clapp, ·and others have identifi ed apprenticeship, specialization, reciprocity, hard work and legislative courtesy as key legislative norms .1
More recently scholars have focused on "committee-specific" norms:
values related to the functioning of particular Congressional committees.
Richard Fenno's pioneering work on the House Appropriations Committee identified norms especially stressed within that panel: apprenticeship, hard work, unity, minimal partisanship. More recently, Fermo,
John F. Manley, and other scholars have found a variety of norms,
values, and "decision-rules" existing in several committees. 2
Despite the attention paid these committee-specific norms, there
has been little assessment of the impact these subsystem norms may have
on the Congress as a whole. As Matthews and Stimson have noted,
"service on at least the better integrated House committees tends to
socialize the specialist into an overall committee point of view which
may diverge from the views of Congress as a whole." 8 If this does
1 Donald R. Matthews , U. S. Senators and Their World (New York: Random
House, 1960); Ralph K. Huitt and Robert L. Peabody, Congress: Two Decades of
Analysis (New York: Harper and Row, 1969); Charles L. Clapp , The Congressman:
His Work as He Sees It (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1963); and, Herbert
B. Asher, "The Leaming of Legislative Norms," American Political Science Review,
68 ( June 1973), pp . 499-513.
2 Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political
System; The Problem of Integration," American Political Science Review, 56 (Jun e,
1962), pp. 310-24; John F. Manley, "The House Committee on Ways and Means:
Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee," American PoUtical Science
Review, 59 (December , 1965), pp. 927-39; and, James T. Murphy, "Political Parties and the Porkbarrel: Party Conflict and Cooperation in House Public Works
Decision-Making," American Political Science Review, 68 (March, 1974), pp.
169-85.
s Donald R. Matthews and James A. Stimson, "The Decision-Making Approach
to the Study of Legislative Behavior," a paper delivered at the 65th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1969. Cited in Arthur G. Stephens,
Jr., "Mobilization of Liberal Strength in the House, 1955-70: The Democratic
Study Group," American Political Science Review, 68 (June 1974) , p. 668.
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occur, the legislative output of major committees may not reflect the
distribution of opinion in th e House. In addition, these committee specific norms may be transferable to others contexts, i.e. the norms
learned in committee may affect th e Congressman's entire legislative
outlook, not simply work within his area of specialization. 4
This paper is a preliminary investigation of the "carry-over" of
committee norms into general voting behavior. The House Appropriations and the Ways and Means Committees are compared on two somewhat contrasting norms held by their members. Changes in floor voting
behavior of new members over a series of Congressional sessions ,are
examined for evidence of socializing influence. Specifically, the paper
will focus on the question of whether differing internal committee norms
concerning partisanship and ideology affect Democratic members' voting
behavior on the House floor. The choice of these two committees for
study reflects several considerations: the centrality of both committees
in Congress, the rather stabl e membership of both , the demonstrable
persistence of a well-dev eloped system of norms within each, and the
existence of a wealth of information on both panels. Since new members
are typically added to both committees only after considerable House
service, a baseline of voting behavior can be established, facilitating
examination of changes resulting from protracted committee membership and repeated exposure to committee norms and values.

The Problem
According to Fenno •and Manley, both Committ ees have been highly
integrated bodies with fairly consistent sets of norms, inculcated in new
members through elaborate socialization process. Various sanctions are
used by committee leaders to encourage proper learning and discourage
d eviance from committee values and modes of operation. Although both
possess effective mechanisms for socialization of new members, many of
the specific no1ms taught are different. For example, in Appropriation s
the norm of specialization and reciprocity among specialists is greatly
emphasized; the Ways and Means Committee until very recently rewarded generalized expertise. This contrast in norms undoubtedly resulted in rather different internal decision-making modes. 6
There rare ,also variations in two committee "folkways" which seem
likely to have more generalized effects on members . The first involves
4 Asher hints at the problem of whether norms learned in one context may be
transferable to another. "The Learning of Legislative Norms," p. 513.
5 Richard F. Fenno, The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.), pp. 161-163, and, John F. Manley, The
Politics of Finance (Boston: Little , Brown and Company , 1970), pp. 94-95
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political or ideology. Fenno discovered a complex of Appropriation Committee norms which emphasize fiscal and economic conservatism: the
necessity of cutting the Federal budget , protecti ng the Treasury, and
guarding the power of the purse. D espite the persistent efforts of Democratic leaders to "pack" Appropriations with liberal Democrats , the
Committee atmosphere usually triggered a conservative reaction by
these new members. On the basis of interviews , Fenno argued that
"within one or two terms, Democratic liberals -are differentiating between themselves ,and the 'wild-eyed spenders' or the 'free spenders' in
the House." Republicans, appointed to the Committee becaus e of their
"fiscally responsible" attitudes, find their conservatism reinforced}' The
Ways and Means Committee exhibits a different set of values. As on
Appropriations, new Democratic members are usually added on the
basis of their liberal credentials. Unlike Appropriations, however , the
dominant internal ethos of Ways and Means does not emphasize shingent conservatism, but rather "responsible," "moderate," and "pragmatic"
liberalism among Democrats and similarly restrained Republican conservatism. Although many observers have felt that the resultant mix
produc ed a "standpat" bias, Ways and Means has been less emphatically conservative than Approp riations. The socialization process within
the Committee may impart a conservative bias, but if so, it should be
less obvious than that of Appropriations. 7
A second important normative difference between the two Committees involves partisanship. A vital feature of the Appropriations Committee, according to Fenno, is the norm of "minimal partisanship."
Although members with high degrees of party loyalty are appointed on
both sides, the Committee's mode of operation emphasizes subordinating party considerations to the central values of budget-cutting and
economy, a rule of behavior which obviously creates the great est strain
for Northern Democrats. Ways and Means is considerably different;
Manley observed that its central norm has been "restricted partisanship," party regularity moderated by good interparty personal relationships and overall businesslike conduct of the Committee's work. Given
these rather different limits on the degree of permissible partisanship,
one might hypothesize that Appropriations newcomers will become less
6 Fermo, Power af the Purse, pp. 213-214. Fermo made no effort to determine
whether or not this change showed up in member voting behavior outside the committee.
7 Manley, The Politics of Finance, Chapter 3. Some observers, most notably
Al Ullman, the present chairman of the Committee, have attributed the growing
conservatism of some Democratic members to their experience on Ways and Means.
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 32 (December 7, 1974), pp. 3248-49.
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party conscious as they assimilate Committee norms, whereas those
added to Ways and Means should show less change. 8
Although both Fenno and Manl ey imply at points that both these
norms ,are relevant primarily to internal decision-making, it seems unlikely rthat new members could entirely compartmentalize the impact of
learning norms with such over-arching tdeological implications. 9 For
example, it seems improbable that liberal Democrats joining Appropriations could become conservative in handling the Federal bud get in
committee and remain consistently liber al in floor votes. Similarly, habits
of nonpartisanship engendered within committee might well result in
gene:rialized declines in party loyalty . Titis paper attempts to provide
some evidence supporting the existence of such "carry-over" effect.
Procedure
To explore the possibility that committee socialization may have
differential impacts on legislators' overall voting record, at least in these
committees, this paper focuses on new members ,added to Appropriations and Ways and Means from the mid-1950's through 1968. The
Congressional Quarterb/s Conservativ e Coalition (CC) and Party Unity
(PU ) scores constitute the major source of data on voting behavior used
here. Although CQ's Federal Role score formerly calculated would also
be useful, it is not available for th e entire period and was frequently
based on a rather narrow ran ge of votes. Thus, the Conserv ative Coalition score is used ,as a preferable indi cator of conservatism-liberalism. 10
In asmuch as the CQ studi es are not bas ed on a fixed underlying
continuum, with ,a true zero point, it was deemed inadvisable to use the
raw scores on Conservative Coalition and Party Unity voting. The major
problem involves the intuitive meaning of a num erical score. For example, a Democratic member's twenty per cent support for the Conservative Coalition one year might be a relatively conservative position visa-vis the House Democratic average, wh ereas it might actu ally b e more
s Fenno, Power of th e Purse, pp. 164-65; Manley, Politics of Finance, pp. 64-65.
For Fenno's implication that the learning proc ess affects _primarily attitudes
toward "money matt ers," see Power of the Purse, 213 . Cf. Manley, Politics of Finance, pp . 68-70.
lo CQ's Party Unity score is based on th e percentag e of times a party member
votes with a majority of his party on roll calls in whi ch a majority of Democrats opposes a majority of Republicans . The Party Opposition score is the per cent age of
times a party member votes in disagre ement with th e majority of his party. Failure
to vote lowers both Party Unity and Party Oppo sition scores. Both scores are used
here as a means of checking the possibl e impli cations of non-voting for appar ent
changes in party regularity. The Conservative Coalition support and opposition
scores are based on roll calls in which the majority of voting Republi cans and the
majority of Southern Democrats oppose the majority of North ern Democrat s.
9
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liberal in the following year. As a result, trends indicated by raw scores
are not particularly reliable.
To acquire usable data, the author has adopted a different strategy.
Trends in voting behavior have been measured by the deviation of individual scores from overall party and group means. Assume, for instance, the following hypothetical series of CC scores for a Northern
Democrat:

cc

..........

.

.. . . ...

Mean for Northern Democr:ats
Individual Deviation from
Northern Democratic Mean ....

1965

1966

1967

1968

20%
20%

13%
15%

18%
22%

26%

-2

-4

0

10%

-16

This is a clear illustration of •a congvessman becoming steadily more
liberal in comparison with the average Northern Democrat. In this
fashion, annual scores for new members of both Committees were calculated for their years in Congress. Then, the mean score ( deviation)
for new members before and after joining each committee was calculated for Conserv ,ative Coalition Support, Conservative Coalition Opposition, Party Unity, and Opposition to Party. In this fashion, members
were identified as becoming more or less conservative and more or less
party-conscious after accession to Committee membership. In addition,
the mean changes in ideological and party orientation were also calculated as a check on the magnitude of the directional shifts.

Findings: The Democrats
The expected differences between D emocratic addees to Appropriations and Ways and Means do appear in changes in Conservative
Coalition voting. Table I. provides a brief summary of these changes.
The Conservative Coalition support scores indicate that Appropriations members shift decisively toward a more conserv ative overall orientation after committee service. Not only do most members become
more conservative, but the average movement is rather substantial. The
CC support tabulation, on the other hand, reveals very little change in
Ways and Means Democrats, who retain most of their pre-appointment
liberal proclivities. The CC opposition scores provide added evidence
that Appropriations Democrats grow more conservative, but they indicate that Ways and Means Democrats also adopt more conservative
habits. That the Ways and Means group does not provide •additional
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TABLE I
Conservative Coalition Voting Among Committee Democrats
Coalition Support
Appropriations
No . Mean Change
More Conservative
More Liberal
Net:

......

. ....

16
5

(9 .1)
(5.0)

( 5.8)
11
More Conservative

Ways and Means
No. Mean Change
8
7

(7.5)
( 6.7)

1
(0.9)
More Conservative

Coalition Opposition
Appropriations
No. Mean Change
( 12.6)
(5.8)

More Conservative
More Libera l .. .

14

Net:

7
(6.5)
More Conservative

7

Ways and Means
No. Mean Change
6

(11.9)
( 4.4)

3

( 5.4)

9

More Conservative

positive support for the Coalition suggests that the net decline of opposition to the Conservative Coalition largely reflects roll calls missed by
busy Ways ,and Means members. In any case, the relative changes in
conservative voting among members of each committee do confo1m to
earlier expectations .
Which D emocratic members contribute most to the conservative
movement? As Table II reveals, the most dramatic rise in conservatism
occurs among Northern liberal Democrats, primarily those on Appropriations .
Northern Democrats become much more conservative on Appropriations
and slightly more conservative on Ways and Means, taking both the
direction and magnitude of changes into account. Among Southern Democrats no substantial ideological shifts appear, with the possible exception of a decline in opposition to the Conservative Coalition among Ways
and Means Democrats. As noted earlier, it seems unlikely that this drop
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TABLE II
Conservatism and Regional Scores Committee Democrats
Northern Democrats
Coalition Support
Appropriations
No. Mean Change
(9.6)

5

(3.4)

3

More Conservative
More Liberal .. . ....

14
2

Net Change:

12
(7.9)
More Conservative

.. . .....

Waysand Means
No. Mean Change
(6.0)
(6.8)

( 1.2)
2
More Conservative

Coalition Opposition

Appropriations
No. Mean Change
More Conservative
12
More Liberal . . . . . . . 4
Net Change:

Ways and Means
No. Mean Change

( 13.6)

4

( 16.6)

(7 .5)

4

( 4.8)

0

(5.9)

8
(8.3)
More Conservative

More Conservative

Southern Democrats
Coalition Support
Appropriations
No. Mean Change
More Conservative . .
More Liberal
Net Change:

2
3

(5.8)

(6.2)

1
( 1.4)
More Liberal

Ways and Means
No. Mean Change
3
4

(9.9)
(6.6)

1
( .5)
Liberal Conservative

Coalition Opposition

Appropriations
No. Mean Change
More Conservative
More Liberal . . . . . . .
Net Change:

2
3

(6.6)
(3.6)

1
( .5)
Liberal C onseroative

Ways and Means
No. Mean Change
5
2

( 8.1)
(3.6)

3

( 4.8)

More Conservative
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reflects real changes in perspective, in the absence of corresponding increases in active Coalition support. Nevertheless, among liberal North erners large voting shifts are appar ent on Appropriations and, to a lesser
extent, on Ways and Means.
Tthe respective Appropriations and Ways and Means Committee
norms relating to ideology do seem to influence the general voting behavior of members. Does a similar "carry-over" of the contrasting partisan norms also take place? The figures in Table III indicat e that it does.
TABLE III
Democrats and Party Unity
Party Unity
Appropriations
No. Mean Chan ge

More Unity
Less Unity

6

17

(2.5)
( 8.9)

11
(5.9)
L ess Party Unity

Ways and Means
No. M ean Change
7

19

( 10.7)
(6.9)

12
(2 .2)
Less Party Unity

Party Opposition
Appropriations
No. Mean Change
8
More ,Unity . .. . ...
Less Unity ... .. .. . .. 14

Ways and Means
No. Mean Change

( 3.6)

12

( 8.4)

8

(3.9)
6
Less Party Unity

( 4.1)
(6.0)

( .1)
4
Less More

The table reveals ,a rather substantial decline in partisan support
among Appropriations Democrats, together with a smaller decline in
party voting among Ways and _Means Democrats. This latter decline
among Ways and Means Democrats disappears in the party opposition
scores, indicating once more that the trend may be an artifact, at least
in part, of non-voting.
Which segments of the Democratic party are affected by these
trends? Table IV demonstrates that , unlike the case of Conservative
Coalition voting, the greatest impact of committee membership on party
regularity occurs runong Southern-not Northern-Democrats,
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TABLE IV
Party Unity and Regional Scores: The Democrats
Northern Democrats
Party Voting
Appropriations
No. Mean Change
More Unity . . . . . . . . . 5
(2.7)
Less Unity . . . . . . . . . . 13
( 7.5)
Net : ...........

.....

8
(5.0)
L ess PU

Ways and Means
No. Mean Change
6
(8)
9
(7.5)
3

( 1.3)

Less PU

Party Opposition
Appropriations
No. Mean Change
More Unity

.

. .

.

.. . ..

Less Unity ..........

Net:

.......

.. .. . ...

Ways and Means
No. Mean Change

..8

(3 .6)

7

( 5.1)

9

(8.1)

5

( 4.6)

1
(2.5)
Less PU
(" 1 no change)

2
(LO)
More PU

Southern Democrats

Party Voting
Appropriations
No. Mean Change

Ways and Means
No. Mean Change

More Unity . . . . . .
Less Unity . . . . . . . . . .

1
4

(1)
( 13.4)

1
10

(27.5)
( 6.4)

Net:

3

( 10.5)

9

( 3.3)

..........

Party Opposition
Appropriations
No. Mean Change
More Unity . . . . . . . . . 0
Less Unity . . . . . . . . . . 5
Net:

(0)
(8.9)

5
( 8.9)
Less PU

Ways and Means
No. Mean Change
5
3

(2.8)
( 8.3)

2
(1.4)
More Less PU
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Both groups of Appropriations Democrats, responding to the mileu of
"minimal partisanship," exhibit declining support for their party and
find themselves in increasingly frequent opposition to party majorities,
but the Southern Democrats move farthest. The trends on Ways and
Means indicate a slight lessening of party bonds, but the indicators are
mixed among both Northern and Southern members. Thus, on both
crucial sets of committee norms, the data support, or at least do not rule
out, the hypothesis that "committee-specific" norms may become generalized and affect overall member voting. Differing post-assignment behaviors of Appropriations and Ways and Means Democrats can plausibly
be explained as the result of socialization into differing "rules of the
game" within each committee.11

Discussion and Conclusion
Jobn F. Manley has observed that the internal decision-making
norms of Congressional committees may pre-ordain the political coalitions ,appearing in Congress on issues within their jurisdiction. 12 For
example, ,the Appropriation Committee's norms of unity and nonpartisanship have traditionally been reflected in the lack of major controversy
over money bills on the House floor. If similar effects appear in other
policy areas, committee norms and modes of operation have obvious implications for the structure of Congressional conflict.
The present findings support further research into committee nom1s,
as committee socialization appears to affect members' overall voting behavior. In this sense, the House may be the product as well as the creator of its committees. Studies of additional House committees give us
some further tantalizing hints: the conflict-laden and partisan-oriented
style of the House Education and Labor Committee may dictate not only
how its bills are processed on the House floor, but encourage ideological stridency and partisan zeal among individual committee members,
who may already be policy and ideology-oriented when ,assigned to the
committee. 13 In some cases, however, norms might indeed remain "committee-specific": ,a recent study of the House Public Works Committee
revealed that a "party unity" norm applies within the committee and on
11 The same operations were performed for Re_publicans on both committees,
but as Fermo and Manley might vredict, there was little evidence of major change
in either the degree of party regularity or conservatism exhibited by these members.
Minor post-appointment changes in GOP voting behavior were essentially random
in direction.
12 John F. Manley, "The Presrdency, Congress, and National Policy-Making,"
in Cornelius P. Cotter, ed. Political Science Annual, Volume 5 (Indianapolis and
New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1964), p. 263.
13Richard F. Fermo, Jr. Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little , Brown
and Company, 1973), pp. 74-79.

CoMMIITEE

SoCIALIZATION

117

committee legislation sent to the House floor,14 but a brief survey of
party unity scores of several Public Works Democrats by the present
author failed to disclose any tendency toward greater party voting. If a
systematic survey of these voting patterns bears out this impression, it
might indicate that "party unity" can remain primarily an internal decision-making rule, a norm of behavior confined to th e context of committe e business.
Whatever the findings of further committee studies a tantalizing
point remains: Which individuals are most subject to the socialization
process and which are most resistant? Previous students of socialization
in Congressional norms and folkways have discussed several limitations
on its effectiveness: previous political experience with differing norms,
high er political ambitions, constituency pressures , and strongly-held political ideologies. 15 The experience of Appropriations Democrats provides some evidence on these points. A cursory survey of Democrats
shifting most on party unity and conservatism scores reveals a number
of shared characteristics: most come from relatively rural districts, often
from sections of the Midwest or West settled by South ern migrants; few
face powerful constituency pressures in the form of large labor unions
or other liberal lobbies; most are not affiliated with intra-House lib eral
blocs such as the Democratic Study Group , which might provide peer
group reinforcement of their original liberal orientations and party regulaiity; finally, most appear to be House and Committee careerists, accommodating themselves to committee norms and values, waiting to rise
to a position of leadership within the existing structure. 16
The deviant cases among Democrats illustrate the factors which
prompt a member to resist socialization. Most who move against the
stream of Committee conservatism and lessened partisanship are dearly
influenced by strongly liberal ( often highly urban) constituencies, hopes
for higher partisan political office, and in a few cases, by considerable
previou s political experience. Although information on intra-House affiliations is lacking , at least some are also active in non-committee networks which compete with and reduce the effectiveness of committee
socialization mechanisms.
A final caution is in order. Recent changes in Congressional operations may require major shifts in the focus of socialization reseai·ch. The
14
15

Murphy, "Political Parties and the Porkbarrel," p. 177.
Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World, pp. 102-117; Murphy "Political
Parties and the Porkbarrel," p. 178.
'
16 See, for example, the biographies of George E. Shipley, John T. McFall, John
Slack, Julia B. Hansen, W. R. Hull, and Neal Smith in Michael Barone, Grant
Ujufusa, and Douglas Matthews, The Almanac of American Politics, 1974 (Boston:
Gambit, 1973).
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increasing turnover of membership in the House, the declinin g prerogatives and sanctions of committee leaders , and the growing role of
subcommittees and their chairman obviously alters the context for committee socialization. For example, th e Appropri ations Committee has
seemingly become more liberal as large numbers of new Northern Democrats ,are added, apparently beyond th e capacity of the Committee's
integration mechanism to process , and as the conservative Committee
leadership is stripped of its pow er by the Democratic caucus. Similarly,
the increased size of the Ways and Means Committee , the creation of
several subcommittees, and the replacement of Wilbur Mills by Al Ullman have ,all had substantial impact on the way that panel operates.
Thus, the results reported here may be primarily of historical interest,
as committee socialization takes new forms in a rapidly changing Congressional environment. 17
1 7 For the changes in the House Appropriations Committee norms, see Aaron
Wildavsky, The Politics CY/the Budgetary Process, 2nd ed. ( Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1974), pp . 213-216; for the Ways and Means Committee, see "Ways
and Means in 1975: No Longer Pre-eminent," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 33 January 10, 1976, pp. 40-44.

